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The popular understanding is that conception, birth, and death are the most natural 
facts of human life. We are all created at the moment of conception; we come into being at 
birth, and are gone forever after we die. We cannot escape these three events that determine 
our entry into and departure from being. It is entering this world that makes new reproductive 
technologies a philosophical, anthropological, and religious challenge. Various technologies, 
from relatively simple artificial insemination to more sophisticated IVF and ICSI, are all part 
of the effort to enable infertile couples and individuals to have children, to fulfill their desire 
for children. As altruistic and benevolent as these technologies and options seem, they are 
nevertheless a subject of vigorous debate and even ideological disputes. Lay people and many 
scholars understand the desire for children as perhaps the most natural desire of all, which we 
(supposedly) share with most species of the animal kingdom (Bydlowsky 1998).1 Even more, 
ideas of conception, birth, and death are cognitively linked to the notion of nature and natural. 
Moreover, from this point of view, sexual intercourse is another natural fact (Schneider 1980), 
leading to pregnancy and shared physical substance, which is again a fact of nature (Schneider 
1980; Bestard 2006). On the other hand, conception is not merely the beginning of a new life; 
it is the beginning of new relations between individuals, new relations that are incorporated 
into the wider interpersonal networks of family and kinship or relatedness. It seems obvious 
that, at least in popular discourse, the notion of kinship and family is deeply connected with 
biology; for medical professionals this is perhaps surprisingly even more obvious. These ideas 
are simply part of the ethnocentric construction of kinship, as Schneider put it (Schneider 
1984), but nevertheless the relation between culturally constructed nature and culture itself 
                                            
1 The idea that the desire to have children is natural, particularly for women, is very popular among evolutionary 
psychologists and sociobiologists, who claim that the mother-child bond is the basis of all social relations and is 
hence natural. 
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should be thoroughly analyzed. As Sarah Franklin (2003) has said, nature can no longer be 
defined as a prerequisite for social behavior; as she has previously noted in her analysis of 
assisted reproduction, we cannot ignore the fact that biology presents certain natural facts 
produced by technology (Franklin 1995). 
 The development of medicine and medical technologies has greatly affected our 
understanding of nature and natural facts. Nature and its facts became uncertain and fluid, 
even contradictory and a matter of negotiation. Within interpretations of assisted 
reproduction, natural facts are not so much opposed to cultural or social norms, but rather to 
facts and procedures that are perceived as unnatural. Although Bestard (2006: 254) rightfully 
observed that ‘nature has lost this capacity to dictate the social relations of kinship,’ it seems 
that medical discourse (at least in Slovenia) is trying to reinstate nature as the main driving 
force behind new reproductive technologies. Further development of genetic technologies and 
research on the human genome conflated nature with cultural and social norms (Pálsson 
2007), which can no longer be interpreted separately. Nonetheless, the separation of what is 
natural and what is cultural/social, although false, still persists in scientific discourse and 
common public discourse. I intend to show today that the opposition between natural vs. 
social/cultural has often shifted to an opposition between natural and unnatural. Based on 
interviews with medical professionals, public discourse, and fieldwork, I intend to show the 
ideological basis of the natural vs. unnatural opposition, in which unnatural is understood as 
either artificial or immoral.2 
 Assisted reproduction in Slovenia has a relatively long tradition, although until the 
year 2000 it was not adequately regulated by legislation. Despite the lack of legislation the 
first successful in vitro fertilization in Slovenia resulted in birth of twin girls in 1984. 
Intrauterine insemination with donor semen was also possible until 1994 when it was banned 
                                            
2 The interviews were conducted when new legislation concerning treatment of infertility and assisted 
reproduction was in parliamentary procedure in 2001. 
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until the new legislation on treatment of infertility and assisted conception including donor 
procedures was accepted in 2000. During the parliamentary procedure the donor insemination 
and particularly rights of single women to donor procedures were in the centre of the dispute. 
The law did not allow single women to have right to donor insemination or any other form of 
biomedical assistance at conception, and that was the main reason for the attempt to modify 
the law a few months later. With the amendment of the law single women gained the right to 
procedures of assisted conception. However, after a couple of months the referendum was 
called to overturn the new legislative decision. The result of the referendum showed that even 
75 % of voters that attended the referendum voted against changes of the law, and thus single 
women were yet again denied the right to assisted conception. The fieldwork and the 
interviews were conducted in the time of these events.  
A statement by the distinguished Slovenian lawyer Alojzij Finžgar that artificial 
reproduction has to imitate nature has often been quoted: ‘Procreatio artificialis imitatur 
naturam’ (cited in Zupančič 1998: 239). Because assisted reproduction should follow nature, 
it is important that ‘unusual and unnatural procedures are not to be permitted’ (Zupančič 
1998: 239). The special feature of this quote is not so much in the lack of definition of what is 
unnatural, but particularly in the question of what is or can be unusual when talking about 
assisted reproduction. The answer can be found in interpretation of scientific and public 
discourse about assisted reproduction. There is only a thin line between natural and artificial 
when analyzing assisted reproduction. That is particularly evident when ideas and thoughts of 
physicians working in the field of new reproductive technologies are analyzed. Sexual 
intercourse resulting in pregnancy is the natural source of parenthood and kinship relations. 
Assisted reproduction procedures are thus defined as artificial, although in the eyes of 
physicians they can be understood as natural as well. Medical professionals often have quite a 
specialized understanding of natural vs. artificial regarding new reproductive technologies. 
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They very often understand assisted reproduction as natural although, considering all of the 
possible technological and medical procedures, one physician has stated that ‘assisted 
reproduction is not so natural any more’ (Dr. D). It is thus evident that assisted reproduction is 
therefore natural, but some procedures are drifting away from nature. Nevertheless, the main 
idea for medical experts is that assisted reproduction is above all helping nature (and hence 
natural), and therefore they tend to develop procedures as similar to natural reproduction as 
possible.3 The same physician that I already quoted explained this at length: 
 
“Most people probably understand assisted reproduction as being too artificial, too 
mechanical, they think that we force everything, but actually, if you see the procedures 
close up, you see that the procedure is very natural, quite natural, because, for example, 
you have multiple egg cells, and you perform the same procedure on all of the egg cells, 
and some of the cells will be fertilized, others won’t, with some women all the eggs will be 
fertilized, with others none will be fertilized, although you perform the same procedure in 
the same way, optimally. Some cells get fertilized, some don’t, some fertilized egg cells 
will develop into embryos, and some fertilized egg cells won’t develop into embryos. Just 
like in nature, the situation is the same as when everything is natural. Nature is always here 
and we can do everything optimally, but this is a natural procedure, nature is the one that 
decides whether fertilization will occur or not. Actually we only help here, with a little 
help. People perhaps imagine everything altogether as artificial, how we’re really dictating 
the fertilization of the egg cell, dictating implantation and birth. We’re only creating 
certain conditions for nature to do its task or not. Therefore a lot of people have the wrong 
impression of this procedure. (Dr. D)” 
 
This quote is a rather clear example of the confusion of the notions and the facts of nature 
in medical discourse and it develops further: 
 
“I support two things: the first fact is that human reproduction should be as natural as 
possible, so we should follow the natural path, and the second is the fact, which is very 
natural – medicine can make a lot of progress, we have a lot of knowledge, there are a lot 
of couples we can help, but there are, have been, and will always be people without 
children. That is nature. There are also people that won’t have some other things, but that’s 
something we’ll have to get used to as soon as possible. (Dr. D)” 
 
Therefore new reproductive technologies are just a medical aid to natural processes. 
However, this help, minimized by reproductive professionals, cannot always trick nature and 
                                            
3 As opposing to cloning, this is rejected by the majority of medical professionals on the basis of unnatural one-
sex or same-sex reproduction. 
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its processes, so some women and men cannot have children, not even with medical 
assistance. It is quite obvious that minimizing the medical role in the process of assisted 
reproduction can and does serve as a certain alibi of scientific and technological failure. In her 
research on the use of ultrasound in the early period of the assisted reproduction,4 after 
embryo transfer, when there is no guarantee that pregnancy will occur and even less that 
pregnancy will lead to birth, Eva Maria Knoll (Knoll 2003) has shown that ultrasound serves 
as a manipulation of success, freeing reproductive professionals of responsibility for possible 
failure. Together with the embryo, the responsibility for a successful pregnancy is transferred 
to the woman. Similarly, the well-known French gynecologist Jacques Testart explained to 
women right after the embryo left the catheter that they were pregnant (Lucas 1991: 1212) – 
similar words by Israeli medical professionals have also been cited by Susan Kahn ( 2004). 
 As already stated, the procedures are presented as an aid to nature, but nature does not 
always seem to obey. Despite efforts to help, sometimes nature just does not want to do what 
medicine is trying to impose (it seems necessary to note at this point that in the discourse of 
medical professionals nature is personified and it appears almost as a subject). Physicians, at 
least some of them, are well aware of this and one of them has commented that assisted 
reproduction means that a ‘person is subjected to technology without the guarantee of 
success’ (Dr. C). To follow natural conception procedures and to enhance the success rate of 
the procedures, the gynecological clinic in Ljubljana has developed an interesting ‘natural 
cycle’ procedure, as they call it. In the natural cycle procedure, they follow the menstrual 
cycle of the woman and harvest the egg cell when it is ready, without the prior use of 
hormonal treatment. In a certain way they are therefore harvesting ‘natural eggs.’ This is a 
relatively successful attempt to follow natural procedures as closely as possible and to 
                                            
4 In the case of IVF and embryo transfer. 
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diminish the artificial, technological notion of assisted reproduction. The main benefit of this 
procedure is precisely the fact that hormonal therapy is no longer needed for women: 
 
“I have to mention another thing: namely, at our clinic we very successfully perform the 
natural cycle. The natural cycle method was originated by Professor . . . . we have been 
using this natural cycle method for quite some years; it is very popular among women and 
it is clinically successful as well. We follow the natural cell of the woman, and at the 
proper moment we remove it from the ovary and we perform the IVF procedure on that 
natural cell. The procedure is very successful in the case of female infertility, whereas with 
low semen quality the chance of success with one cell is smaller. (Dr. D)” 
 
 It is peculiar to see something called a ‘natural cycle’ (actually a menstrual cycle) to 
have an originator, even a male originator, and that the women whose ovaries produced the 
egg is excluded as a subject from the procedure. On the other hand, the natural cycle is an 
important attempt to make procedures that are psychologically and physiologically very 
stressful for the woman as easy as possible. However, understanding a procedure that in its 
first phase is really easier on the woman because hormonal therapy is no longer needed as 
natural, or just a slight deviation from nature, is highly questionable and ideological: 
 
“I’d say it’s, physiologically it’s different, the intervention into nature, in the natural cycle, 
in the natural procedure it’s insignificant, almost nothing, and it’s really, instead of 
ovulation, the follicle doesn’t break itself, you puncture it, fertilize the cell outside the 
body, and return it to the uterus. (Dr. B)” 
 
 It is interesting that the main obstacle to the use of this method is supposed to be 
financial. It would be logical and, in particular, easier for women to try a couple of natural 
cycles before hormonal treatments, but the fact that at the time of writing insurance pays for 
only four (and now five) attempts at IVF prevents many women from trying the natural cycle. 
One of the main reasons that women with fertility problems do not use the natural cycle is the 
problem of numbers. Namely, the natural cycle generally produces only one egg cell and 
therefore only one potential fertilized egg for the cycle, and implanting only one embryo into 
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the uterus significantly reduces the success rate.5 However, it is not really clear why only a 
one-embryo policy is used in the natural cycle because in a couple of months several egg cells 
can be harvested and fertilized. However, the practice is that in the natural cycle only one 
embryo is implanted. There are two possible reasons for this. The first is probably the goal of 
following the natural path as closely as possible – namely, by not freezing embryos. The 
second, which is far more logical, is the desire to avoid multiple pregnancies, which more 
often result in miscarriages. The small number of egg cells and embryos therefore very often 
prevent women from trying the natural cycle because only five attempts are paid for by 
insurance. The often false fear of failure is another reason to try the hormonal cycle and have 
several embryos transferred in the procedure. Namely, women and couples that come to seek 
help at fertility clinics often do not have a lot of time left, and the logic of high numbers 
appears very attractive to them. It is thus interesting that in the eyes of physicians legal, 
financial, and bureaucratic obstacles actually render the method less attractive and force 
couples to choose ‘less natural procedures.’ 
 The similarity of the method called the ‘natural cycle’ and the actual natural procedure 
is a source of excitement and satisfaction among physicians, although of course the statements 
seem at least peculiar: ‘The natural cycle is good, particularly because the procedure is very 
similar to the natural procedure’ (Dr. E).6 However, the natural cycle is only part of the in 
vitro fertilization procedure, so the procedure is only partially ‘natural,’ although, as we have 
seen, in the eyes of medical professionals IVF itself is very natural because no matter what 
and how they perform the procedure it is up to nature whether the egg will finally be fertilized 
or not. Nonetheless, the IVF procedure, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and other 
techniques used in assisted-reproduction processes are all technological inventions, they are 
                                            
5 However, the clinic stated that the success rate is really better with natural-cycle eggs, which is (implicitly) 
attributed to the fact that hormonal treatment can produce egg cells of inferior quality that are less likely to lead 
to successful fertilization. 
6 Not surprisingly, the natural cycle is patented. It might seem odd that the menstrual cycle is also actually 
patented here. Perhaps royalties shall have to be paid by menstruating women to the rightful owner of the patent. 
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carried out using highly sophisticated instruments and we can justifiably assume that only 
after fertilized eggs are implanted into the uterus can the procedure really be left to ‘nature.’ 
Therefore, the natural cycle of the woman is nevertheless a part of the procedure, but there is 
a phase of unnatural, artificial procedures and conditions, a time when the embryo develops 
outside the female body, and the responsibility for its development is not, or at least should 
not be, the responsibility of the woman. However, the responsibility is not entirely transferred 
to the woman even after implantation. The pregnant woman and the embryo are medical 
issues (Ragoné & Willis 2000) and they are subjected to medical attention and control 
throughout the pregnancy, and the conception procedure is completely irrelevant (Knoll 
2003). 
 On the other hand, artificial reproduction procedures raise ambivalent questions and 
feelings, and even fear among professionals themselves: ‘If the physicians start creating life, 
they become gods and that’s not good, it’s not acceptable’ (Dr. E) so perhaps it is better ‘to be 
conservative and to hold back progress (. . .) if there are doubts it will be better to stay behind 
and not to demonstrate we’re capable of that’ (Dr. E). The reason for that is the awareness of 
the physicians of the unnaturalness of the procedures, awareness of the fact that those are 
experiments on living people, in which the results are always uncertain: 
 
“Along with removing natural barriers, the objective danger of procedures resulting in 
something bad is growing (. . .) we transfer parents’ genetic material into the child and I 
think that the descendant could have the same fertility problem as the parent, if nothing 
else. (Dr. B)” 
 
 I think we must consider here that the idea of assisting nature comes from a false 
assumption. Infertility or low fertility is actually nature’s fault; we are dealing with nature’s 
defect because nature is not fulfilling our expectations and its duties. Assisted reproduction 
therefore circumvents nature and actuates what nature does not make possible for individuals 
(Strathern 1999b). Assisted reproduction is basically assistance to individuals or couples that, 
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despite nature’s limitation, want to have children. Assisted reproduction is therefore not to 
help or to assist nature, but assistance that enables fulfillment of the desire to have children 
(Strathern 1999b), which, as we saw earlier, can be understood as the most natural desire of 
all. It would be then more appropriate to talk about procedures against nature and not 
assistance to nature. At the same time, reproductive professionals do not understand 
technological reproduction as unnatural but as an improvement of natural unpredictability 
(Schmidt & Moore 1998) and such an understanding further strengthens the thesis that 
assisted reproduction procedures represent a certain way of tricking nature. 
 Therefore, the question of natural vs. artificial is easily answered for medical 
professionals by a rather unconvincing thesis: that assisted reproduction is just a small step 
around natural obstacles and is essentially almost as natural as nature itself. To support this, 
physicians seem to break the procedures to the small steps and then pick up bits and pieces of 
procedures to be able to define these in terms of nature; hence they are searching for 
fragments of naturalness in order to gather evidence to support the thesis that the procedures 
are almost as good as natural, and therefore they are almost natural – and, if they are almost 
natural, we can omit ‘almost’ and define them as natural. However, because the relation 
between natural and artificial seems more like an exercise in confusion, I believe that the 
opposition between natural and immoral can be more productive, and particularly so because 
it is based on the understanding of the family. 
 As already presented in the quotation from Alojzij Finžgar, the artificial should imitate 
nature, and unnatural and unusual procedures are unacceptable. It is clear even from this 
interpretation that we are dealing not only with the relation between nature and technology, 
but more with the relation between nature and morality – unnatural and unusual are associated 
with the notion of immoral, and as such they are very often the source of almost apocalyptic 
fears in public, political, and scientific discourse: we can hear warnings about the decay of 
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human societies if basic laws of nature are broken, if moral and ethical principles are violated; 
warnings that the healthy family will be destroyed if assisted reproduction is used to help 
single women or even homosexuals have children; because, as certain a physician wrote in a 
newspaper article – ‘humanity always, even in the caves, lived in couples, and this means that 
marriage is a natural institution.’ Morality and nature are thus very closely connected and are 
placed above any doubts. The violation of their principles will lead to a disaster. The result of 
such ideas is the axiomatic definition that what is natural is moral, and what is unnatural is 
immoral. 
 However, if we are able to define the relationship between natural and artificial as a 
relationship between non-technological and technological, technology cannot be the answer 
when the opposition of natural vs. unnatural and unusual is understood in terms of morality. It 
is therefore necessary to address this question from two different viewpoints. The first deals 
with the question of what is legally permissible for scientists to analyze and study. Slovenian 
legislation, for example, does not allow experiments on human embryos unless the written 
permission of the couple that the embryos belong to is given. Creating embryos for the 
purpose of experimentation is strictly forbidden (therefore only leftovers from couples are at 
scientists’ disposal). However it is not clear what can be done with aborted embryos because 
they are not mentioned in the act. The question is whether it is possible to use them for 
research and whether written permission of the woman is necessary or not. The problem is 
that the act only regulates treatment of infertility and assisted conception, and obviously 
abortion has no place in this act, but nevertheless we can presume that those embryos and 
fetuses are not to be used for research. Cloning of any kind is strictly forbidden as well. 
Nevertheless there is an open window for scientific research, although with relatively strict 
and sometimes ambivalent restrictions, but moral and ethical dilemmas concerning research 
on embryos, although somehow disputable, seem to be solved. 
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 On the other hand, the relation between natural and immoral becomes far more 
disputable and a matter of discussion when the question of the family is involved. Here I must 
note that assisted reproduction in Slovenia is only allowed for heterosexual couples, married 
or not. Donation of cells is allowed, but only one cell can be donated to the couple; hence 
double donation (donation of sperm and egg) is not permissible. The donation of an embryo is 
not allowed even with permission of the couple who give the cells. Single women, let alone 
homosexuals (single or in a couple) are not entitled to assisted reproduction procedures. The 
key argument against single parenthood and one-parent families or homosexual parenthood 
and families is the assumption that only the nuclear family is natural, because it is founded on 
the relation between a man and a woman and the relation between a woman and a child, 
which is a natural relation (Cannel 1990). This assumption is founded on the fact that parents 
create social relations and ties on a biological basis (Strathern 1999a). However, it is obvious 
that the mother-child relation cannot be logically linked only to the nuclear family. The 
mother-child bond is present in single-mother families as well. However, those who argue that 
a single-parent family is not natural have a different and peculiar reasoning. Namely, for them 
it is the social bond between the mother and father that is the distinctive feature of the family, 
and fatherhood is precisely what is missing in single mothers’ families as well as in lesbian 
families. In the eyes of the opponents to single-parent and homosexual families, it is the 
relation between the mother and father that is the prerequisite for the next important family 
relation – the relation between the father and child – and those two relations are apparently 
understood as natural and they are the basis of the family as well.  
Therefore, there are three natural bonds within the family and all three have to exist to 
have a nice little family that everybody will be happy to see: the mother-father bond, the 
father-child bond, and the mother-child bond. This last bond is natural by definition, but is 
often left aside in ideological discourse. After the mother-child bond is defined as natural, 
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some kind of peculiar reasoning develops the thesis that the mother-father and father-child 
bonds are natural as well. It is possible to interpret this in a way to demonstrate that the bond 
between a woman and a man that is clearly recognized as social is also understood as natural, 
whereas in the case of single or lesbian motherhood the relation between the mother and the 
child, which is natural even for socio-biologists and evolutionary psychologists, can no longer 
be perceived as natural. The family is thus very often morally acceptable only when it is a 
nuclear one, a natural one, and thus should be protected in the name of the nation, religion, 
and morality (Rener 1995). All other types of family (single-parent families, families of 
homosexual partners, etc.) are thus defined as unnatural. However, the paradox of 
motherhood as unnatural seems to persist and it presents a problem for opponents to single 
and lesbian motherhood. They have found a disputable solution for the paradox when new 
reproduction technologies are in question. Namely, any other solution than allowing assisted 
reproduction only to heterosexual couples would be unusual and in contrast to the legal sense 
of the citizens of Slovenia. Terms such as ‘legal sense’ and ‘unusual’ are of course very 
dangerous in any legal matter and legislation, but they nevertheless persist in legal discourse. 
Those terms are founded on a peculiar and limited morality, allowing arbitrary interpretations. 
One example of this interpretation was incorporated into Act on Marriage and Family 
Relations Act: 
 
“. . . parents act for the benefit of children if they meet their material, emotional, and 
psychosocial needs, acting in a way that is acceptable and approved of by society . . . 
(ZZZDR/ACAAMFR, §5a)” 
 
 The paragraph seems quite innocent but, by establishing that society renders behavior 
acceptable or approvable, the act actually refers to arbitrary morality. One can conclude that 
society approves of and accepts natural and moral behavior, and that it does not approve of 
and accept immoral and hence unnatural behavior – for example, single-parent families, or 
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single or two-parent lesbian or gay families, and perhaps even two-parent heterosexual 
families with an unconventional lifestyle. Thus the question of a natural family is really a 
moral one, mainly based on the assumption that the only acceptable family form is the nuclear 
family because that is the most common type. However, restricting the family to one type on a 
moral basis is irrational and morally contestable. As John Harris (2002) once wrote, referring 
to scientific research on embryos but quite applicable here as well: it would be irrational not 
to allow something that is not morally contestable. The fact is that nature serves as an 
ideological alibi to restrain the possibilities of choosing a lifestyle, of choosing the children 
and family life one wishes to. It is morality that underlies this particular ideological 
understanding of nature, and morality is arbitrary and culturally specific. 
 The notion of nature and natural can thus be used ideologically in several ways, and 
one might say that certain social facts, which are popularly presented as unnatural, are really 
facts seen through the eyes of narrow morality, ideologically shaped through a peculiar 
(mis)understanding of nature. Facts and deeds that are very often ideologically understood as 
immoral are masked as unnatural, which gives those propagating such ideas an alibi for their 
views. In this particular sense, I think that the concept of nature is obsolete and should be 
abandoned as an analytical tool, or at least used only in a very precise and narrow sense. Of 
course, we cannot banish the use of the words ‘nature’ and ‘natural,’ but we should always be 
very cautious when using them so as not to use them as an ideological tool, but instead 
interpreted in the framework of the particular theme involved. Instead of using the words 
‘nature’ and ‘natural,’ I propose being more precise and using narrower definitions and 
descriptions that can be theoretically justified. For example, one might take kinship relations, 
which are in many ways understood in terms of nature, but (as assisted reproduction has 
shown) we should use them in a precise manner. Of course, we do not use expressions such as 
‘natural mother’ and ‘natural father’ (although I have heard the latter used), but we should 
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exercise caution even for definitions such as ‘social motherhood’ and ‘social fatherhood’ 
because new reproductive technologies have shown that there are a full seven possible 
relations between a women and a child (Åkesson 2001), and a purely social relation is only 
one of them, although it is the only one that matters. A genetic relation, which is one of the 
possible relations between a mother and child (and a father and child as well), is another good 
example. Genetic kinship relations seem to be natural par excellence, but when observed 
closely we can see that genetic kinship (real genetic kinship, not an imagined one) is always 
mediated through highly sophisticated technology. Natural facts can of course be mediated 
and defined through technology, but in this particular case genetic relation is only an 
imagined relation if technological intervention is not present. Hence genetic kinship is pure 
imagination if not interpreted by scientific knowledge and technology, and is therefore 
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New reproductive technologies and biotechnology are challenging many common facts about 
nature. Various forms of assisted conception can change the understanding of a family, 
parenthood, personhood, and personal identity. Based on interviews with physicians and other 
professionals at a fertility clinic, the particular understanding of ‘natural technologies’ is 
discussed. The idea of ‘natural technology,’ or technology that imitates nature was a powerful 
argument when the family and parenthood were debated some years ago in Slovenia, when 
new legislation on assisted reproduction was adopted. This paper shows that nature and 
culture can no longer be defined in separate discourses. Cultural and natural facts are 
increasingly becoming fluid, and even a matter of negotiation. Therefore, it is perhaps 
necessary to abandon those concepts as separate entities and observe them as a single concept 




Les noves tecnologies de reproducció i la biotecnologia desafien molts llocs comuns sobre la 
natura. Formes diverses de concepció assistida poden canviar la comprensió de la família, la 
paternitat i la maternitat, la persona i la identitat personal. En base a entrevistes amb metges i 
altres professionals d’una clínica de fertilitat, aquest article analitza la comprensió particular 
de les “tecnologies naturals”. La idea d’una “tecnologia natural”, o una tecnologia que imita 
la natura, constituia un valor ideològic important en les discussions sobre família, paternitat i 
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maternitat a Eslovènia ara fa uns anys, quan es va promulgar la nova legislació sobre 
reproducció assistida. Aquest article mostra que natura i cultura ja no poden ser definides de 
manera separada. Els fets culturals i naturals són cada cop més fluids i constitueixen fins i tot 
objecte de negociació. En conseqüència, potser caldria abandonar aquests conceptes en tant 
que entitats separades i considerar-los com a un únic concepte susceptible de ser observat des 
de punts de vista diferents. 
 
